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by
J.J.M. EVERS and M. SHUBIK.
1. INTRODUCTION.
This paper is aimed at exposition and modeling several of tlie
extremely detailed but necessary aspects of a closed competitive economy
without a terminal time point, i.e. an economy which is closed with re-
gard to trade and competitors at any point of time but is an ~-horizon
economy or is open ended with respect to time.
Particular attention is paid to invariant competitive equilibria,
or in other words: competitive equilibria which can repeat themselves
over time.
A number of simple models are studied which have just enough ingre-
dients to expose the meaning of a couple of crucial assumptions.
Our choice criterion concerning modeling the monetary institutions
is quite rigorous based on the rule: minimize complexity while maintain-
ing essential aspects of economic relevance.
The results concerning "accounting money" and "negotiable shared"
may be considered as illustrations of more general results already obtained
by Evers~ and indicated by Shubik.~~
~ Evers (1975).
~~'Y Shubik ( 1973 ) .Our approach is related to but different in emphasis from the con-
siderable amount of work being done in what can be call.ed "Temporary
General Equilíbrium Thecry". A detailed survey of this work has been
:.
presented elsewhere by Grandmont. We do not attempt to summarize this
survey here but rather try to indicate where our approach is similar and
where it differs.
We believe that many of the phenomena associated with money and
financial institutions cannot be fully appreciated without a clear speci-
fication of the dynamic featur~s of an economy in disequi-
librium. Ftiu~thermore we believe that when both exogenous uncertainty and
bank money are present in an economy even the specification of stationary
equilíbrium conditions involves details concerning the method of issue
of bank money and the possibility of bankruptcy and even bank failure.
In short the minimal description of the dynamics calls for a specification
~e~c
of rules which amount to a Mathematical Institutional Economics as the
rules which specify the limitations on process amount to a description
of rudimentary financial instruments and institutions.
Because, in this paper we are primarily concerned with invariant
equilibria and we rule out exogenous uncertainty we obscure many of the
features of money and financial institutions which appear clearly only
in dísequilibrium. However even for a carefully defined stationary equi-
librium far more detailed modeling is required than is usually used.
This discrepancy is easily explained when we observe that in a stationary
equilibrium much of the financial apparatus lies dormant and in effect
"disappears" to the casual observer.
~, Grandmont (1975).
'~ Shubik (1975).- 3 -
2. ON MONEY AND StiiARES
2.1. On Three Types of Money.
In much of the literature and popular debate on monetary control
"ttie amount of money" in the economy is frequently referred to. Before
this can be meaniugfully discussed we must specify what is meant by "money"
and who creates it and how it is destroyed.
There are many shades of ineaning and fine distinctions which can
be made in measuring the "moneyness" of many different items in an economy.
We cffer a simplification into three classes which we define and discuss
below.
(1) Accounting money -"inside" interpersonal money or instant trust.
It includes clearing house operations where no bank or government
money cheaiges hands. It is generally interest free. It includes
casual loans among friends; 30 day credits to purchasers; intra firm
transfers, intra agency transfers. All trade where the exchange is
an "on faith" crediting and debiting.
(2) Bank money - money issued by distinguished or special individuals.
They can be "inside" or "outside" of the private sector. If they
are inside then the rules for the spending of profits of the bank-
ing system must be specified.
A convention of use has bank money accepted in trade: i.e. even if trader
i will not take j's accounting money he accepts from j a debt instrument
on bank B.
It is importaxit to note that bank money is bank debt. It may come
into circulation when individual j exchanges claims with bank B. I.e.
j gives B his r.ote or "paper" (which may or may not be negotiable) andB gives A its paper (usually in the form) of a drawing account or
sometimca i.t may give casii.
(3) Govertiment money - fiat money -"outside" money and is issued and
controlled by the government. It includes coins and notes, often
referred to as cash. It may also include an array of short term
governmental debt instruments bearing various interest rates.
The full meaning of all the "monies" noted above can only be given by
fully specifying their rules of operation, or laws.
2.2. On shares.
Shares, as they appear in our models are negotiable certificates
of ownership. The details concering voting rights, dividend entitle-
ments and so forth do make a considerable difference among these instru-
ments and it is easy to construct instances where the very existence of
any economic equilibrium depends upon the details of the specification
of corporate law concerning voting rights.
Corporate shares are a part of the broader class of financial in-
~e
struments which we may term as "ownership paper". This includes for
example, house deeds, automobile ownership paper and other evidences of
ownership for durables. Features such as whether the item is owned singly
or jointly and what are the conditions on the negotiability of the instru-
ment must be specified in order to describe its use.
In this paper we make the same gross simplification as Arrow and
;~::
Debreu and others by ignoring the voting aspects of shares and assuming
~ Shubik (1975).
'{~~ Arrow and Debreu (~954 ).- 5 -
that short term profits in the dynamic context are well defines and are
paid out to stockholders in proportion to their shares.
3. THE PHYSICAL ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE MODELS.
In the remainder of this paper we work with a ntimber of simple
e~.amples all of which have the same nonmonetary economic background.
They differ only in their monetery and financial aspects. In this sec-
tion the nonmonetary áspects of the models are described. We assume
that economic activities take place at a sequence of "periods" with
equal duration, numbered t- 0,1,2,... . The initial period is num-
bered 0. The moments of period changing are called "time-points".
We refer to the time-points as "the start of period t", or "the end
of period t". The total number of periods over which the activities
take place is nct specified. We cover this aspect by assuming an "infinite
horizon".
ïhere are two types of' commodities: "labor" and a simple consumer
g~od-say "wheat". Quantities of labor and wheat will be represented
b;; non-negative scalars, which are sometimes endowed with a sub-index
referring to a time-point.
In the model we have three agents: two "individuals" and one "firm".
The activities of the individuals are characterized by consumption of
w~eat, supply of labor, and by financing of the firm. The latter will
be specified later. For each period, firm's activities are characterized
by taking inputs (i.e. labor and wheat) at the start of that period and
transforming these into outputs (i.e. wheat) which become available at
the end of that period. The productive process takes exactly one period.We assume that only the firm is able t.o carry out production. Further-




























Under these assumptions, the flow of commodities may be represented by
Figure 1. The action plans of the individuals are described sequencea
of scalars {(zt,wt))t-~, {(zt,wt))~-~, where zt (i is 1 or 2) stands for
the consumption of wheat at the beginning of period t by individusl i,- 7 -
and where wt represents its labor-supply at that time-point. Firm's
action plan is described by the sequence {(xt,vt,yt)}t-1;
where: xt
is the wheat-input at tkie beginning of t, vt is the labor-input at
the beginning of t, and where yt is the output of wheat which becomes
available at the end of t.
Under the assumption of a closed economy and of free disposal, the
ba].ance of goods is formulated by:
zt t zt t xt ~
(3.1) t - 1,2,...,
vt ~ wt t
where yU represents a given amount of output which is an initial con-
dítion (the result of production in a period prior to the start of this
model).
Individual's consumption-labor supply possibilities are supposed








i 1,2, t- 1,2,... , with wl,w2 ~ 0.




yt~xt~vt ~ 0For simplicity reasons, we here assume that the production function is
a neo-classic.
A path {(zt, wt, zt, wt, xt, vt, yt)}t of consumptiohs, labor supplies,
and inputs-outputs will be called feasible if it satisfies the physical
constraints (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3). Under the assumptions mentioned
above, we have the following property:
Property 3.4.: For every initial state y~, there is a number M such
that every feasible path {(zt,wt,zt,wt, xt, vt, yt)}t-~ satisfies:
1 1 2 2
zt, wt, zt, wt, Xt, Vt, yt c M, t - 1,2,... ([1], th. 1.8.2.)
m
In that context {(zt,wt)}t-1 is called a feasible action plan of
individual i, if (3.2) is satisfied and if, in addition, this sequence
is bounded. In a similar sense we shall use the term: feasible action
plan of the firm.
In this study invariant paths
(zt, wt, zt~ wt, xt, vt, Yt) :- ( z~, w~, z2, w2, x, v, Y), t- 1,2,...
with initial state y~:- y, take a central place. Clearly, in that
context the physical condítions ( 3.1), (3.2), and (3.3) take the form:
z~ t z2 } x- y ~ 0
v-w~ -w2 ~ 0
(3.5) w1 ~ wl, i- 1,2.
Y ~ f(x,v)
z~,z2,w~,w2,x,v,y ~ 0
Then, under the assumptions mentioned above, we have:- 9 -
Property 3.6.: The solution set of (3.5) is bounded ~
'Po complete the "non-value" part of our model, we assume that
individual's choice criterion can be expressed by:
(3.6) E (ni)t . Wi(zt). i - 1,2,
t-1
w2iere J ~ n. ~ 1 is the time-discount factor of individual i, and where
i
~i is his single-period utility function on (for simplicity reasons)
"wheat"-consumption, only. We assume that these single period utility
functions are continuous, concave, increasing, and finally: ~i(0) - 0.
Under these assumptions, boundedness of feasible consumption-supply
paths implies that the infinite-horizon utility functions (3.6) are
well-d~fined.
4. MODEL 1: ACCOUNTING MONEY ANU NEGOTIABLE SHARES.
A'1 expenditures and earnings of the agents are expressed in units
,~: values; i.e. as products of prices and quantities, representing only
a bookkeeping reality. In addition, prices and dividends (which are de-
fined later) constitute the only information, concerning the system as
a whole, agents use by use by choosing their action plans. The prices
of "wheat" and "labor" at the beginning of a period t are denoted by
non-negative numbers pt and qt, respectively.
We assume that, at the end of each period, the firm supplies its
total outputs to the commodity market. Next, the inputs with respect
to the succeeding period are completely financed by the individuals.
C~nsequently, the yields of the outputs at the end of that period - say
~) Evers, J.J.M., (1975)- 10 -
period t- are distributed among the individuals in the same proportion
as each of them contibutes in financing the inputs at the start of period
t. These contributions, from now on to be called shares, will be repre-
m
sented by a sequence of non-negative scalars {st}t-0, i- 1,2, where
st stands for the contribution of the ith.individual at the beginning
of period t. Now, given prices and shares, the budget constraints of the
firm is formulated: pt.xt t qt.vt ~ st t st, t- 1,2,... and, consequnetly,




(4.1) subject to: yt ~ f(xt, vt) ~t - 7,2,...
pt.xt t qt.vt ~ st t st
Denoting optimal solutions by sequences {(Xt' vt' yt)}t-1 ( Provided they
exist), one can interpret a sequence {dt}t-1, satisfying
(4.2)
1 2
Pttt'yt - dttl'(Sttst)' t - 0,1,...,
as a sequence of dividend-factors or as liquidating dividends.
With this definition, the liquidating values which become available to
the individuals at the end of each period t, can be expressed by
dttl.st, i- 1,2. In order to cover the case of st t st - 0 for some
t
period t, the definition must be refined .
However, in this particular example the simplifying assumptions allow
us to ignore the zero-budget case of the Pirm.
Focusing our attention to invariant prices and shares
(pt, qt, st, st) :- (p, q, sl, s2), t- 1,2,..., the corresponding
x Evers, J.J.M., (1975)- 11 -
economic behavior of the firm can be expressed by:
(4.3) max p.y, over x,y,v ~ 0,
subject to: y ~ f(x,y), p.x t q.v ~ s1 t s2.
The corresponding dividend-factor d has to satisfy:
(4.4) p.y - d.(s1 t s2),
provided y is optimal.
With respect to the budget constraints of the individlials, the
effect of buying shares,and earning the profits one period later,is
~xpressed as follows:
(4.5) pt.zt - qt.wt t st - dt.st-1 ~ o, t- 1,2,...,
where individuals income is obtained from the sale of his labor-supply
and the receipt of liquidating dividends (qt.wt } dt.st-1) and where
expenditures consist of consumption and buying new shares (pt.zt } st).
Thus, given the prices of "wheat" and "labor"
{(pt,qt)}t-1, a,nd given
the dividend-factors {dt}t-1, the economic behavior of the individuals
is characterized by:
(4.~) m3x E( ni)t.~pi(z`), over zt, wt, st ~ ~, t- 1,2,...,
t,-1 -
subject to: wt ~ wt, pt.zt - qt.wt t st - dt.st-1 ~ 0, t - 1,2,...,
where the initíal shares s~ are the given result of the past.
~
In the case of invariant prices and dividends:- 12 -
(pt,qt,dt) :- (p,q,d), t- 1,2,..., these programs take the form:
~
(4.7) max E (n~)t.~;(zt), over zt,w~,s} ~ 0, t - 1,2,...,
t-1
subject to: wl ~ vl, p,z1 - q.wl t sl - d.sl ~ 0, t- 1,2,... t- t t t t-1 -
In connection with the total balance goods (3.1) we meirtioned already
that we may restrict ourselves to bounded action plans. For invariant prices
this ia,plies that firm's demand for shares is bounded,.as well. Thus,
without loss of generality we may limit ourselves to bounded action plans
i i z) ~
{(zt,wt,st }t-1, i- 1,2,;.i.e, to action plans subject to:
(~.8) zt,wt ~ N1, t- 1,2,..., i- t,2,
(4.9) st ~ N2, t - 1,2,..., i- 1,2,
provided the constants.N1, N2 are chosen large enough.
For invariant optimal action plans, it appears that the ~-horizon
decision processes, described by (4.7), ( 4,8), and (4.9), can be reduced
to the following single-period decision processes:
(4.10) max ~i(zl), over zl,wl,sl ~ 0, subject to:
i - 1,2.
i -i i i i i w ~ w, p.z -q.w t ( 1-ni.d).s ~ ( t-ni).d.sp
More precisely, under general assumptions ( satisfied in our model), we
have the following properties:
Proposition 4.11.: If, for any initial amount of shares s~, {(zt,wt,st)}t-1- 13 -
is 1'cusit,le wi1,h re.~pect to (4.7), (4.8), (4.9) then, for the same
initial share:, (zl,wl,sl) :- ((1-ai)~ni).Et-1 (ni)t.(zl,wl
any initial amount of shares s~,
feasible solution of (4.10). In addition we have:
oi(zl) ~ (( 1-~ri)Ini).Et-1(ni)t.~i(zt). ([11, th. 3.4.2. ana 3.4.4.).
Proposition 4.12.: If, for
is optimal with respect to
sl - sp, then ( zt, wt, st)






.- (i ,w ,s ) , t - 1,2,... is an
program defined by (4.7), (4.8),
provided s~:- sl. (~1], th. 3.4.5.)
optimal
(4.9),
Proposition 4.11 states that every feasible solution of the ~-
horizon problem can be identified with a feasible solution of the
corresponding single-period program.
Proposition 4.12 says that invariant optimal m-horizon action plans
can be found as optimal solutions of the single period program by chosing
appropriate initial shares. We observe that the opposite is not stated;
i.e. an optimal m-horizon action plan which is invariant does not
necessarily generate an optimal action with respect to the corresponding
single-period program.
However, the properties mentioned above ensure that the "best" invariant
~-horizon action plans will be selected by the single-period programs
with appropriate initial shares. For that reason we adopt the síngle-
period programs as the adequate deseription of individual's economic
behavior under invariant prices and dividends. Obvious].y, the most
important advantageof the single period approach is- 11a -
that tre influence of prices and dividend-factors on individual's
invariant optimal action plans can be read off very easily.
Describing an individual's economic behavior in a single-period decïsion
process is possibly more realistic than assuming multi-period (or even
m-horizon) decision procesess. For the latter implicitely is based on the
assumption that individuals possess, and actually use, price information
over the whole time-horizon.
Now, starting from the economic behavior of individuals and the
firm as described above, we define an invariant competitive eguilibrium
(briefly I.C.E.) fur this model, as a combination of invariant prices,
dividend-factors, and invariant action plans
i i i 2 1 2 (p'q'd'{(z 'w 's ) }i-1' (z,v,y)) with s ts ~ 0 such that:
i i i
(a) (z ,w ,s ), i- 1,2, is optimal with respect to the single-period
programs (~r.10), with ( p,q,d,s~) :- ( p,q,d,sl)
(b) (z,v,y) is optimal with respect to firm's single-period
program (~.3), with (P~4~s1~s2) :- ( P.q~s1~s2).
(c) The dividend-factor d satisfies p.y - d.(s1 t s2)
(d) Total demand and total supply of "wheat" and "labor" are equal;
1 2 1 2
i.e. z t z t z- Y~ W t W - v.
Under general assumptions,covering our model, it can be shown that
t
such an cornpetitive equilibrium exists.
Considering individual's single-period decision process (4.10) in
the context of the I.C.E. conditions (a) and (d) the following properties
can be deduced as necessary conditions for the existence of optimal action
x) Evers, J.J.M., (1975)- 15 -
plans or as necessary conditions for optimality feasible actions:
Prcposition 4.13~ p~ 0. Argumentation: individuals utility function
is increasing. With p- 0, the individuals always are able to increase
tneir utility by increasing their consumption.
Proposition 4.14: d ~ 1~ni. Argumentation: with ni.d ~ 1, individuals
always are able to increase their utility by increasing tk~eir
amount of shares and their consumption.
Proposition 4.15: ni.d ~ 1 implies sl - 0. To be deduced as a necessary
condition for optimality, under p ~ 0.
st
Proposition 4.16: Defining n.- max ( n1,n2), s1 t s2 ~ 0 implies
:~
cl - 1~n . Direct consequence of 4.14 and 4.15.
Proposition 4.17: q~ 0 implies w1 - w1, w2 - w2. To be deduced as a
necessary condition for optimality, under p~ 0.
Proposition 4.18: p.íl-q.wl t( 1-~rt..d).sl -(1-n.),d.'sl, i- 1,2, i i
To be deduced as a necessary condition for optimality, under p~ 0.
In a similar manner firm's single-period decision process (4.3)
gives rise to be following properties concerning an I,C.E.
i i i 2
(P~9.ede{(Z ~W ~S )}i-1s (X~usY)):
Propositicn 4.19.: s1 t s2 ~ 0 and p~ 0 imply: q ~ 0. To be deduced
as a necessary condition for the exist~nce of an optimal solution.- 16 -
.,1
:'ru~~ositicu h,~'0. N~ 0, q~ 0 impl i~~::: p.z t y.v -..
'l'u l~c dt~duced us u itecessnry coud it i un 1'or of~L imiil i t,y.
, y - t'(x,v).
In the numerical example the role of these properties is illus-
trated. F~zrther, the definition of an I.C.E. implies the following
homogenity property:
Proposition 4.21.: If ( p,q,d,{(zl,wl,sl)}i-1, ( x,v,y)) is an I.C.E.
then, for every a~ 0, ( a.p,a.q,d,{(zl,wl,a.sl)}i-1, (x,v,Y)) is an
I.C.E., as well.
Turning our attention to the underlying dynamic character of an
I.C.E. (p,q,d,{(z1,wl,sl)}i-1, (z,v,y)), the relations between the
~-horizon decision processes and the single-period programs impl,y:
Proposition ~t.22.: (zt, wt, st) :- (zl, wl, 'sl), t- 1,2,..., is optimal
with respect to the ~-horizon program defined by (4.6), (4.8), and (4.9)
i i
with (pt, q,t, dt) :- (P, q, d), t- 1,2,... and sC :- s.
Proposition 4.23.: (xt, vt, yt) :- ( z, v, y), t- 1,2,... is optimal
with respect to the sequence of the programs (~.1) with
1 2 1 2
(Pta ~s St~ St) .- (pi qs 5 ~ S) ~ t- 1,2,...
Now consider, for any sequence of positive numbers {dt}t-0 with
d~ :- 1, a price-system (pt,qt) :- dt.(p,q), t- 1,2,,.. Then the
structure of the ~-horizon decision processes implies the following
properties with respect to the I,C.E.:
Proposition 4.24.: (zt,wt,s~) :- (z1,wl,dt.s1), t- 1,2,... is optimal
with respect to the m-horizon program (4.6), with(Pt~q.t~dt) .- ( dt~F~dt.4~ (dt~dt-1).á))e t- 1,2,..., artd s~ - 51.
Frcposition 4.25.: (xt'vt'yt) '- (x,v,y), t- 1,2,... is optimal with
respect to (~.1) with (pt,qt,st,st) :- dt.(p,q,s~,s2), t- 1,2,...
In addition, the sequence of dividend-factors defined by
dt :- (dt~dt-1).d, t- 1,2,... (viz. 4.24) satisfies the relation:
,~
Ytt1'yt - dt}1.(st } st)~ t- 0,1,..., with yG :- Y~ sC t sÓ -'s t s.
([ 1] , th. 5. 1. 3. )
Interpreting the sequence of pos.itive numbers {dt}t-Q as inflation
or deflation ratios, it should be clear that these statements can be
taken as: "the physical part of an I.C.E. is independent with respect
to any degree of inflation or deflation".
A next topic in the dynamic context of an I.C.E. is the question
of Pareto efficiency. Given an initial state y~, we introduce two
different optimality criteria:
Definition strict efficiency: ~.26.: A feasible path
1 1 2 2 m
{(zt'wt'zt'wt'xt'vt'yt)}t-1





~t-1 (ni)t'`~i(zt) ~ ~t-7 (~i) '~i(zt)'
i - 1,2, with strict inequality
for at least one i.
Definition weak efficiency 4.27.: In this concept, the optimality criterion
of 4.26 is replace3 by: ~i(zt) ~ cpi(zt), i- 1,2, t- 1,2,..., with strict
inequality for at least one pair (i,t).- 1g -
Clearly, strict efficiency is based or. a complete ordering over
the periods and weak efficiency on a partial ordering. Evidently,
strict efficiency implies weak efficiency.
Under much more general assumption than imposed on our model it
can be shown that every invariant path generated by the physical part
of an I.C.E. is weakly efficient. If, in addition, the time-discount
factor are equal (i.e. n1 - n2) then such a path is strictly efficient.
([ tl , th. 5.2.4. )
5. Model I with a Cobb-Douglas production function.
Restricting ourselves to the case where s1 t s2 ~ 0, and assuming
ttiat n1 ~ nL, we summarize the properties 4.]3 to 4.20 concerning an I.C.E.
(P. q~ d~ {(zl~ wl~ S1)}i-1~ (z~ ~~ Y)):
(1) p ~ 0, q ~ 0.
(2) á - 1~n1.
(3) W1 - w1, w2 - w2.
(4) v - W1 t w2.
(5) Y - f(z,'v).
1 2
(6) 1~d. p.y - P.z t q.v - s t s
Now, we consider the following maximization problem:
(5.1) max p.f(x,y) over x,y ~ 0, s.t. p.x t q.y ~ s] t s2.
Using Lagrange multiplier technics, one can deduce the following necessary
condition for (x,v) to be optimal w.r.t. (5.1):
(5.2) fx(x,v)~fv(z,v) - P~Q,- 19 -
where ff and fv are the partial derivatives of f(x,y) with respect to
z and v resp.
Further, by the relations (5) and (6) we have:
(5.3) (1.Id).p.f(X,v) - p.?c t q.v.
Defining:
(5.!,) x .- zlv, P .- PIq,
snd using the linear homogenity property of the non-classical production
function~(5.3) and (5.~) can be reduced to:
(5. 5)
fx(x,7)Ifv(x,1) - P
` (1Id).p.f(x,l) - p.x t 1.
(Note, the relations ( 1) and (4) imply that x and v are well defined).
With the help of system (5.3) it is possible to express x and p as a
function of d. To be specific~ let us assume that f(x,v) is a Cobb-
Douglas production function of the form p,xu,vv, with p,u,v ~ 0, u t v- 1,
;hen (`i.3) implies the relation p.a - ulv and (1Id):p.x -(ulv)t1
wGich can be reduced to:
(5.ó)
P - (ulv).(u.Pld)-llv
{ ~ - llv
x - (i~.Pld) .
From (5.la), (5.6), and from the relations y-~,X~ ~" and
~






s t s - (1Iv).q.'v
p.x - (ulv).q.' v
p.y - (dIv).q.'v.
Further, defining wi :- w1I(w]tw2), y'i :- s1I(slts2), the relations
v- w]tv~, d-]In], s~ts2 -(1IS).q.v, and property 4.18 imply:
(5.8) z1lv - (P.n])]Iv.uulv.[v.wit(n. -~).y l , i - 1,2.
i
One may verify that z] t z2 t z- y, implying that the total demand
of "wheat" equals total supply (viz. equilibrium condition d).
With respect to share holding, we distinguish two cases:
(1) n2 ~ n], and ( 2) n2 - n]. In both cases we have á- ~In].
In the case that n2 ~ n], we have n2.d ~], implying (by 4.]5) that
s2 - 0. Consequently, 's~ - q.vlv.
In the case that a2 - n] we have n2.d -], n~.d - 1, implying that
every share distribution s], s2 is compatible with an I.C.E., provided
s] t 's2 - q.vlv.- 21 -
6. Model II-a: Fiat money and neROtiable shares.
Starting from the same physical structure as described in 4 3,
we now assume that all payments have to be carried out with the help of
a legal means of payment, to be called "fiat-money". Fiat money is
characterized by the following assumptions: (1) The value of one unit
is one. (2) It cannot be produced, it is not subject to attrition, agents can
not destroy it, (3).Stock holding of fiat money or "hoarding" is
permitted, (4) In accordance with the assumption that the exchange of
commodities takes place at the moments of period change, we assume that
all payments take place at these time-points in such a manner that,
at each time-point, all transactions must be covered completelv by
payments in fiat money.
The order of transaction and payments can be specifie3 in
several ways. We shall study three different cases; in all of them we
assume that the order of payments is invariant over the time-points. Our first














FIGURE 2.In t:his, the amounts of fiat money owned by individual i at the
di fl'~~r:~nt stages oi' transactions and payments at the end of' period
t-1 are represented by non-negative reals at'1, at'2, at'3. The amounts
of fiat money he owns during period t-1 and period t are expressed
by at'~ and at'~ resp.
Concerning the firm, the diagram is based on the assumption
that the life time of the firm is exactly one period; i.e. the firm
scting during a period t has to be estabilshed at the beginning of t
and has to be liquidated at the end of that period. Since in the
diagram, the "new" firm buys its "wheat" input from the "old" firm,
the "new" firm must be established just before the liquidation point
of the "old" firm. The amounts of money, owned by the firm acting over
period t, is denoted b~, bt, bt ~ 0. F~rther, the money streams
bétween individuals and firms are represented by the horizontal arrows.
With these assumptions the amounts of fiat money held by
individuals and firms during the periods has to satisfy:
(6.1) a1'C t a2'C t b0 ~ a1'0 t a2'~ } bC , t - 1,2,...,
t t t- t-1 t-1 t-1
where a~'~, a~'~, b~ are the given initial amounts óf fiat money.
Now, the budget constraints of .the individuals (see (4.5))
are replaced by the following balances of payments:-23-
(E~.2)
i,1 i,0 i
at - at-1 t st ~ 0
: ~
at'` - at'1 - qt.wt ~ 0
~
at" - at'2 t pt,zt ~ 0
i,0 i,3 i
at - at - dt.st-1 ~ 0
t - 1e2~...
Firm's balances of payments can be su~arized by:
0 1 2
pt.xt
} qt.vt } bt ~ st } st
(6.3) t - 1,2,...
1 2 0
dttl'(st t st) - Ptfl'yt } bt
With vt ~ wt t wt, zt t xt ~ yt-1' t- 1,2,..., the relations
(6.2) and (6.3) imply (6.1).
Starting from invariant prices (p,q) and an invariant dividend
factor d, an individual's economic behavior is characterized by:
m
(6.4) max E(ni)t.Wi(zt), over zt, wt, st, at'0 ? 0, t- 1,2,...
t-1 -
subject to:
P.zt - q.wt t st - at'1 ~ 0
at'0 } p.z~ - q.wt t st - d.st-1 - at'~ ` 0
i i,0
st - at-1




where the initial amount of money and shares~ a0' and s0 resp., are
the given result of the initial period t:- 0. Further, proposition(3.4) and the inequalities (6.1) imply that we may restrict ourselves




zt,wt ~ N1, t- 1,2,...,
i st ~ N2, t- 1,2,...,
(6.7) at'0 ~ N3,. i- 1,2, t- 1,2,...,
provided the constants N1, N2, N3 are chosen large enough.
For invariant optimal action plans it can be shown that the
~-horizon deCision processes, defined by (6.4) to (6.7) can be reduced
to the single-period decision processes:
(6.8) max Wi(zl), over zl, wl, sl, al'0 ~ 0




i i - i 0 0
Analogous to proposition 4.12, we have:
Proposition 6.9.: If, for any initial ( s~,a~'0), (yi~Wi~Si~ái,0) is
optimal with respect to (6.8) such that (Si~gi,0)
-(s0,a0,0), then
(zt,wt,st,at'0)
:- (Zi~Wi~Si~~i,0)~ t- 1,2,... is optimal with respect
to the m-horizon program defined by (6.4) to (6.7), provided
(sG,a~,O) :- (Si~ái,0)
and provided the bounds appearing in (6.5) to-25-
(6.7) are chosen large enough.
Briefly: invariant optimal ~-horizon action plans can be found
by solving (6.8) with appropriate initial states (s~,aÓ'0).
The simplicity of max. problem (6.8) allows us to deduce the
following properties:
Yrono3it.i-~n 6.10.: The followinp, conditiona are necessary for max. problem
(6.8) in order to possess an optimal solution:
(1) p ~ 0.
(2) d ~ (l~ni)?.
Proposition 6.11.: If, for some (p.q.d.s~,s~'0) witki p~ 0, q~ 0,
and with d ~(1~ai)2, an action (zl,wl,sl,al'0) is optimal for (6.8),
P.zl-q.wl t(1-ni.d).sl t(1-ni).al'0 -(1-ni).(d.s~ t a~'0).
~i -i w - w .
d c(1~ni)2 implies: sl - 0.
Proposition 6.12.: Consider max. problem (6.8) with p~ 0, q~ 0,
d c(1~ni)2. For such a max. problem, an action ( zi~Wi~Si~ái,0)
~i i ~i,0 i,0
satisfying s- s0, a - a0 , is optimal if and only if:
(1-(ni)2.d).s~ - 0, a~'0 - d.s~~ wl - wl~ P.zl - q.wl t(d-1).sQ.
Turning our attention to the economic behavior of the firm,
the possibility of hoarding of money gives rise to the following max.
problems:-26-
max pt}1.yt t b~, over xt,vt,yt,b0 ? 0
(6.13) subject to: yt ~ f(xt,vt) t-],2,...
pt.xt t qt.vt t bt ~ st t st.
Consequently, the dividend-factors {dt}~ have to satisfy:
(6.14) Ptt1'yt t bt - dtt1.(st ~ st), t- 0,1,2,...,
provided {(yt,b~)}~ is a part in a sequence of optimal solutions
{lxt,vt,Yt,b~)}~.
t~ith invariant prices (p,q) we obtain the max. problem:
max p.y t b~, over x,v,y,b~ ~ 0,
(6.15) subject to: y ~ f(x,v),
p.x t q.v t b~ ~ s1 t s2.
Evidently, we have the following properties:
Proposition 6.16.: If p~ 0, s1 t s2 ~ 0, then a necessary condition
for max. problem (6.14) in order to possess an optimal solution is:
q~ 0. (Implied by the assumption that f is neo-classic).
Proposition 6.17,: If, for some p~ 0, q~ 0, s1 f s2 ~ 0, the action
(x,v,y,b~) is optimal with respect to (6.14), then:
( 1) p.x } q.v t b~ - s1 t s2
(2) y - f(x,v)
(3) p.y f b0 ~ s1 t s2 implieS: bo - 0.- 27 -
Now, let M~ 0 be the initial amount of fiat money in this
econom 1,0 2,0 0
y(i.e. M:- a0 t a0 t b0). Then, starting from the economic
behavior of the individuals and the firm (viz. 6.8 and 6.15 resp.) we
define an invariant competitive equilibrium for this model as a combination
(p,q,á, {('zl,wl,sl,ê.l'0)}1~1, (x,v,Y,bO)), with s1 t s2 ~ 0, such that,
simultaneously:
i i i i,0
(a) For each individual i, (z ,w ,s ,é ) is optimal with respect to
(6.8) with ( P~~q~d,s~,a~'0) :- (P,q,d,sl,~l'0).
(b) (z,v,y,bo) is optimal with respect to (6.`15) with
1 2 1 2).
(P,q,s ,s ) :- (P,~,~ ,S
(c) The dividend-factor d satisfies p.y t b0 -
d.(s1ts2).
(d) Total demand and total supply of "wheat" and ".labor" are equal;
1 2 1 2
i.e, z t z t z- y, w t w - v.
(e) The total amount of fiat money hoard by the agents is equal to the
initial amount of fiat mone 1,0 2,0 0
Y~ i.e. á t á t b - M.
By virtue of the properties 6.10, 6.11, 6.12, 6.16 and 6.17,
and by virtue of the equilibrium conditione, one can deduce:
Proposition 6.17.: If (p,q,d,{(zl,wl,sl,ál'0)}i-1, (x,v,y,b0)) is an
I.C.E. with s1tsL ~ 0, then:
(1) p~ 0, q' 0, w1 - w1, w2 - w2,
2 i i,0
(2) (.1~ni) ~ á implies: s- 0, á - 0.
~ 2
(3) Defining n.- max(~r1,n2), we have á-(1~n ).
(~) P.Z1-q.Wl - (d-1).sl - 0, ~1'0 - á.sl, i- 1,2.
(5) b0 - 0, p.x t q.v' - s1ts2, á1tá2 - M.
(6) y - f(z,v).
s:
(7)
(n.t)2.P.q - 5 1ts2, where n .- max(n1,n2).By virtue of 6.17 and 6.18, it is possible to identify invariant
competitive equilibria of model I with invariant competitive equilibria
of this model with fiat money. More preciesly, we compare this model with
fiat money specified by the quantities ( n1,a2, w1, w2, M), the utility
functions ~1, ~2, and by the production function f, with model I where the
time-discount factors are modified such that n1 :- (n1)2, a2 :- (n2)2.
Then we have the following relation:
Proposition 6.19.: (p,q,d,{(zl,wl,sl)}~, ( x,v,y)), s1ts2 being positive,
is an I.C.E. of model I with time-discount factors ( n1,n2) as defined
above, if and only if, for a:- M~(d.(s1ts2)), for b~ .- 0 and for
(~1,o~á2,o) :- (d.sl,d.s2), the combination
(a.p,a.q,d,{(zl,wl,a.sl,a.ál'~)}~, (x,v,y',b~)) is an I.C.E. for the
model described in this section.
Clearly, replacing the time-discount factors (n~,n2) appearing
in section 5 by (n1)2, (n2)2, the result of this section are fully
applicable on the model with fiat money. We observe that the effect on the
time-discount factors is cause by the fáct that the profits on shares can
be effectuated two periods (instead of one in model I) after the point of
investment.
Further, it should be clear (viz. 6.18-(4)) that the property
concerning inflation, as described in 4.25, is not valid for this model.
Finally we observe that infinite horizon action plans generated by this
I.C.E. are not Pareto efficient (viz. definition 4.26 and 4.27).
Actually, a counter example may be constructed in the setting of 4 5.- 2y -
7. Mod~~l II-b: Piat money and negotiable shares.
In our second model concerning fiat money, the order of
transactions and payments is represented by the following diagram:
individuals firm
F'IGUP,E 3.
Again the amounts of fiat money owned by the individuals and the firm
~
are represented by {(at'0, at,1, at,2)}t-~, i-],2, and
{(b~, bt, bt)}t-1 resp. The initial state is given by (a~'D,aÓ'~,b~).
In this scheme, the exchange of shares and dividends takes place
simultaneously, implying a"on going~~ character of the firm. Fiirther, we
maintain all assumptions concerning fiat money.
With invariant prices (p,q) and an ir.variant dividend factor d,




max E ( ni)t.~i(zt), over zt,wt,st,at'0 ~ 0, t- 1,2,...
i i,0 p.zt - at-~ ~ 0
p.zt f st-d.st-~ - at'~ ~ 0
p.zt-q.wt t st-d.st-~ f at'0 - at'~ ~ 0
t - 1,2,...
where (s~'0, aó'0) is the initial state. As discussed earlier, we may
restrict ourselves to action plans which satisfy:
(7.2) zt, wt ~ N~, t- 1,2,...,
(7.3) st ~ N2~ t- 1~2,...,
(7.4) at'0 ~ N3, t - 1,2,...,
provided the constraints are chosen large enough.
In the same manner as described in proposition 6.9., invariant
optimal action plans can be found by the following single-period
decision process:
(7.5) max mi(zl), over zl,wl,sl,al'0 ~ 0,
subject to: wi ~ wi~
p.zl-ni.al'0 ~ (1-ni).aQ'0
p.zl f(1-ni.d).sl-ni.al'0 ~(1-ni).(d.sÓ t a~'0)
p-zl-q.wl t(1-ni.d).s1 f(1-ni).al'0 ~(1-ni).(d.s~ } a~'0)
With the help of duality methods the following properties can be deduced:
Proposition 7.6.: Necessary conditions for max. problem (7.5), in order
to possess an optimal solutions are:- 31 -
(1) p ~ o..
(2) a ~ 1~ni.
Proposition 7.7.: If, for some ( p,q,d,s~,a~) with p~ 0, q~ 0, and with
d ~ 1~ni, the action ( zl,wl,sl,al'G) is optimal for (7.5), then:




w - w .
~1
d ~ t~ni implies: s- 0.
Proposition 7.8.: Consider max. problem (7.5) with p~ 0, q~ 0, and with
~ 1 n.. For such a max. problem an action (zl wl si ai 0
d ~ , ,N ,~ ,~ ' ) satisfying
- 1
sl - só, al'0 - a~'0, is optimal if and only if:
(1-ni.d).s~ - 0, aó'0 - q.wl t( d-1).s~, wl - wl, P.z - a~'0.
The economic behavior of the firm can be described in the same
way; i.e. by (6.12) and, under invariant prices and shares by (6.14).
Further, replacing individuals optimization proces (6.8) by (7.5), we
can maintain the same I.C.E. concept. Now starting from the proposition
7.6, 7.7, 7.8, 6.15, and 6.16, one will find the following properties:
Proposition 7.8.: If (
p,q,d,{(zi~Wi~Si~ái,0)}i~ (z,v,y,b0)) is an I.C.E.
with sl t s1 ~ 0, then:
p ~ 0, q ~ 0.
P.zl-q.Wl-(á-1)sl - o
i,0 i' 1 2
á - p.z , implying: p.(z t'z )- M.
i
1~n. ~ d implies: s- 0. i
~ ~:
Defining n.- max (n1,n2): á- 1In .-32-
w1 - j;,1, w2 - w2, v- w1 t w2.
b0 - 0, p.z } q.v - s1 t s2, Y- P(z,v).
-~ 1 2 ~
(n ).p.y - s f s, where n.- max(n1,n2).
Comparing the properties 4.13 to 4.20 of model I with the
properties mentioned above, it should be clear that invariant competitive
equilibria of these models are related as follows:
Proposition 7.10.:. (p,q,d~{(~i~wi~si)}i~ ( z,v,y)) - s1 t s2 being
positive - is an I.C.E. of model I,if and only if, for a:- M~(p.('z~t'y2)),
for b0 .- 0, and for (g1'O,fl2'0) :- ( p.'z1, p.'z2), the combination
(a.p,a.q, d,{(zl,wl,a.sl,aál'0)}~, (x,v',y,b0)) is an I.C.E. for model
II-b.
This ensures the existence of an I.C.E. under the same
conditions as mentioned in model I. F~rther, it should be clear that
the property concerning inflation (viz. 4.24 and 4.25) is not applicable
with respect to model II-b.-33-
8. Model II-C: Fiat money and negotiable shares.
In tlie third model with fiat money the order of transactions





The only difference with reGpect to model II-b is that the real dividend
(i.e. (dt-1),st-~) is paid off after the point where shares are exchanged.
It will appear that this affects the nature of the I.C.E, substantially.
Under this scheme, the economic behavior of the individuals




subject to: w~ ~ Wi
i i,0
p.zt-at-~ ~ 0
i i i i,0 p,zttst-st-~-at-~ ~ 0
p.zt-q.wttst-dt.st-~tat'0-at'~ ~ 0 1
~ 0, t - 1,2,...,
t - 1,2,...,
where (só'O,a~'0) is the given initial state. In the same manner as
described in 6.9, invariant optimal action plans can be found by the
single-period decision process:
(8.2) max ~i(zl), over
zl,wl,s1,a1'0 ? 0,





1 1 - i 0 0
For this max problem we can deduce:
Proposition 8.3.: The following conditions are necessary for (8.2) in
order to possess an optimal solution:
(1) p ~ 0.
(2) d ' (~~ni) t ((~-ni)~ni)2.
i i,0
Proposition S.k.: If, for some ( p,q,d,s0,a0 ) with p~ 0, q~ 0, and
with d ~(1~n.) f((t-n.)~n.)2, an action
(zi~~i~Si~ái,0)
is optimal
- i i i
with respect to (8.2) then:






d ~ 1~ni implies: s- 0.
f'ropusitiun 8.'.~.: Considcr max. problem (8.2) with p~ 0, q~ 0, and
2 ~i ~i ~i ~i,0
witti d ~(1~ni) t((1-n )~ni) . For such a max. problem, (L ,w ,s ,a )
satisfying sl - s~,
ai'0 - si'0,
is optimal if and only if:
(1-ni.d).sQ - 0, aQ'0 - 4.w1 t(d-1).s~~ wl - wl~ P.zl - a0'0.
Cumparing this result with the properties f~.10-(~), t~.11-(4)
c,f model II-a and the properties 7.6-(2), 7.7-(2), we observe a
suprising difference. Namely, in (6.8) an optimal solution with sl ~ 0
~
is compatible with a single dividend-factor d:F (1~ni)`, and, in
(7.5) such an optinu3.1 solution is compatible with d-(1~ni) only.
However, proposition 8.5 shows that an optimal solution of (8.2) with
sl ~ 0 is compatible with every dividend-factor d in the closed interval
[ 1~ni, 1~ni t ((1-ni)~ni)2].
Starting from the economic behavior of the firm as described
by (6.4), and replacing individuals optimization procedure (6.8) by (8.2)
we maintain the same I.C.E. concept as defined for model II-a.
Then by virtue of 8.3 to 8.5 and of 6.15 and 6.~6, the following properties
can be deduced:
Proposition 8.6.: If (
p,q,d,{(Zi~Wi~Si~~i,0)}i~ (z,v,y,b0)) is an I.C.E.
with s1 } 's2 ~ 0, then:
(1) p ~ 0, q ~ 0
(2) P.Z1-4.W1-(à-~).sl - 0.- 36 -
(3) ál'0 - p.'zl, implying p.(Z~ t Z2) - M.
i
(4) d ~ 1~ni implies: s- 0.
(5) Defining n~ :- max (n~,n2): d E[1In~, t~n~ t((7-n~)~n~)~].
(6) w~ -w~, w2-w2, v-w~ tw2.
(7) b0 - 0, p.z t q,v - s~ t s2, 'y - f(z,v).
By virtue of the propositions 8.5 and 8.6., it is possible to
identify invariant competitive equilibria of model I with invariant
competitive equilibria of this model. In a similar way as for model II-a,
we compare model II-c, specified by the quantities (n~,~r2,w~,w2,M), the
utility functions ~~,~2, and by the production function f, with model
I where the time-discount factors n~,n2 can be chosen, such that:
n. E[(n.)2~(~rt. t(1-n.)2), n.], i- 1,2. Then we can deduce the following
i i i i i
relation:
Proposition 8.7.: (p,q,d, ( zl,wl,sl) ~ (x,v,y)) -(s~ts2) positive - is
an I.C.E. of model I,with time-discount factors as mentioned above,
if and only if, for b0 .- 0, for a:- M~(p.'z~ t p,'z2) and for
1,0 2,0 ~ 2
(á ,á ) :- (p.'z , p.z ), the combination
(a.p,a.q,d,{(zl,wl,a.sl,~.ál'0)}?, (z,y,v,b0)) is an I.C.E. for model
Clearly, this ensures the existence of such an I.C.E.
Further, we observe that, in this case, the dividend factor is not
uniquely determined.-37-
9. Model III: Fiat nwney, banking, and negotiable shares
In this section we extend model II-c by adding an inside bank,
which inclu3es tha possibility of borrowing and lending money from the
bank, Lhe possibility of holding bank-shares, and th~-: possibility
of paying with bank-cheques. The latter is based on the assumption that
the individuals and the firm are allowed to have a checking account.
Dept on checking accounts are not permitted.
For simplicity reasons, we assume that credit and saving transactions are
available only, for the individuals. We shall discuss the details with the
























individuals firm FIGURE 5.with individual i, during a period t, we associate the following monetary
i ~i
quantities: at ~ 0: hoarding of fiat money, a t~ 0: balance on his
checking account, Ati ~ 0 his savings deposits, Atl ~ 0: his bank credit,
ut ~ 0: his bank shares.
Concerning the firm, during a period t, we have: bt ~ 0:
~
the quantity of fiat money, bt ~ 0: its balance on his checking account.
For the bank, during a period t, we introduce: ct ? 0: the
~
quantity of fiat money, ct ? 0: the total balance on the checking accounts,
Ct ? 0: total saving deposits, Ct ~ 0 total outstanding credits.
Finally, at the beginning of a period t, we have: et: the bank
dividend-factor (to be defined later in a similar mar.ner as firm's dividend
factor) yt ~ 1: interest-factor on checking accounts, at ~ 1: interest
factor on credits, ~t ~ 1: interest factor on saving deposits.
Note: the interest rate which corresponds with an interest-factor - say
yt - is: (yt-~).
Obviously, the diagram is based pn the simplifying convention
that credit and saving transactions are concluded at the final stage, only.
In this, a crucial assumption is that such a contract is terminated on
exactly one period after it is initiated. .
The difference between saving and checking accounts is due to the fact that the
balances on checking accounts are available at each stage, this being a
necessary condition for paying with bank cheques.
We shall discuss the economic behavior of the individuals,
the firm, and the bank, successively.Under invariant prices, dividend-factors, and interest-factors,
(p,q,d,e,a,6,Y), individual's economic behavior is characterized by:
(9.1) max E ( ni)t.Wi(zt)~
t-1
over zt,wt,st,ut,at,ati,Ati,Atl ~ 0, t- 1,2,...,
subject to: wt ~ wt
1 i ~ti i
G n p.zt-at-~- .at-~
-
p,zt f s~-:;L-~ t ut-u~-~-a~-á Y.at~~ ~ 0 t- 1,2,...,
}i ti
p.zt-q~wt t st-d.st-~ t ut-e.ut-~ t At -R.At-~ -
,t ~
-Atl } a.Atl~ t at t tl-at-~-Y.atl~ ~ 0
To the budget restriction we add the "credit limit":
(9.2) ~~(a-1).Atl-~~.q.wt-~2.(st t ut) ~ 0, t - 1,2,...,
where U-~~ ~ 1, 0 ~~2 ~(a-1). Without loss of generality we may restrict
ourselves to bounded action plans; such that:
(9.3) zt~wt ~ N~~ st ~ N2, at ~ N3, t- 1,2,...,
(9.~) atl~ Atl~ Atl ~ M~, ut ~ M2, t- 1,2,...,
provided the constants are chosen large enough. The meaning of (9.4)
will be clarified later (viz. 9.23). Further, the initial state
i i i ~i ti i
(s~,u0,a~,a0 ,A~ ,AQ ) is suppose to be a given result of the initial
period t :- 0.In a similar manner as indicated in proposition 4.12., invariant
optimal solutions of programs defir.ed by (9.1) to (9.~) can be found Y,y
the single-period decision problem:
(9.5)
~ (1-ni).(aÓtY.a~1td.s~te.uQtB.A~1-a.A~l),
(a-1).Á 1-E1.q.wl-E2-(sl}ul) ~ 0.
With respect to this optimization process one can deduce the following
properties, with the help of duality methods:
Proposition 9.6.: Neoessary conditions Yor max. problem (9.5) with
Y~ 1, a~ max(B,Y,d,e), in order to poasess an optimal solution, are:
(1) P~ 0. (2) B ~ t~ni. (3) Y ~ 1~sri.
(4) d ~(Y-1)~(Ri.Y)2 t 1~(Ai.Y) t(1-xi.Y)2I(xi.Y)2.
(5) e c (Y-1)~(ni.Y)2.t 1~(ni.Y) } (1-ni.Y)2I(xi.Y)2.
Proposition 9.7.: Consider max. problem ( 9.5), where p~ 0, q~ 0,
Y E~ 1,1~ni) , 6 ~ 1~ni, d ~(Y-1)~(ni.Y)2 ~ 1~(ni.Y) t(1-niY)2I(ni.Y)2
~c -
max ~i(zi), over zl,wl,sl,ul,al,g 1, A}1, Á1~ 0,
subject to:
p.zl-rti.(al t y.a 1) c( 1-ai).(e~ t Y-a~l),
p.zlf(1-ni).~ltul)-xi.(a1ty.a~1) c (1-ni).(aÓtY.aCltsátu~),
P.zl-q.wlt(1-ni.d).slt(1-ni.e).ul t (1-ni.6).A}1 -
-(1-ni.a).Ált(1-ni).al } (1-ni.y).a~l L
e c(Y-1)I(ni.Y)2 t 1~(ni.Y) t( 1-ni.Y)2~(xi.Y)2, a ~ max (S,Y,d,e,1),0 ~~i ~ 1, 0 ~~2 ~( a-1), and where (a-1),A~1 ~~i.q.wl t~2.(s~tu~).
~'
If, for such s problem, ( zl,wl,si,ui,ái,á i, Á}i,Á i) is an optimal
action then:
(2)
p.xl-4.wlt(1-n..d).slt(1-n..e).u1t(1-a..s).A}1-(1-n..a).A-1 t i i i i
~: ~
t(i-ni).alt(i-ni.Y).a 1 - (~-ni).(a~tY.a ~}d.s~te.u~tS.A~1-a.A~l).
~i -i w - w
(3) Y' 1 implies al - 0
(4) d~ max (1~ai,e) implies: sl - 0.
(5) e ~ max (1~ni,d) implies: ul - 0.
~~
(6) g ~ 1~n; implies: A - 0.
(7) a~ 1~ni implies: Á1- 0.
(8) If a ~ 1~ni then: A-1 -~i.q.wl~(a-i) t E2.(sltul)~(a-~).
Proposition 9.8.: Consider a problem (9.5) as specified in proposition
,~ .
9.7. For such a max. problem, an action (zl,wi,si,ui,ái,á i,Á}i,Á i)
~i i ~i i ~i i ~sci ~i ti ti -i -i
satisf'ying s- sp, u - u~, a - a~, a - a~ , A - A~ , A - A~ ,
is optimal if' anci only if, simultaneously:
(1) For Y~ 1: ap - 0. ( 2) For d ~ max(1~~ri.e): s~ - 0.
(3) For e ~ max ( 1~ni,d): u~ - 0. (4) For s~ 1~ni : A~1 - 0.
(5) For a~ 1~ni : A01 - 0. (6) For a ~ 1~ni :(a-1).AQ1-
~i.q.wlt~2,(sltul), and
For a- t~ni :(a-1).A~1 ~~~.q.wl t~2.(sl}ul).
~r ~
(7) al t a 1- q.wl t(d-1).slt(e-1).ult(S-1).A}1-(a-i).Á 1 0 0 0 0 0 0'
~~
`8) W1 - W1. (9) p.zl - ao t Y.a01.- 42 -
Under invariant prices and interest rates, the economic behavior
c.f th~ firm is characterized by the max, problem:
ie ft
(y.1r~) max p.y t b t Y.b , over x,v,y,b,b ? 0,
subject to: y ~ f(x,v),
p.xtq.vtbtb~ ~ s1 ts2 .
P'cr this program the following properties hold:
Proposition 9.11.: If p~ 0, s1ts2 ~ 0, then a necessary condition for
the problem (9.10) in order to possess an optimal solution is: q~ 0.
(,Implie3 by ttie assumption that f is neo-classic).
Proposition 9.12.: If, for some p ~ 0, q ~ 0, Y~ 1, s1}s2 ~ 0, the
action (x,v,y,b,b~i) is optimal with respect to (9.10), then:
p.x t q.v t b t b~ - s1 t s2.
(2) y - f(x,v)
(3) y ~ 1 implies b- 0
:; 1 2
p,y t b t b ~ y.(s ts ) implies: b- 0, b- 0.
Tur.ning our attention to the bank and to the total demand and
total supply of fiat money, deposits,and credits, we arrive at following
requirements:
(9.13) c t a1 t a2 t b ~ c t a1 t a2 t b ,
t t t t- t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1
~ a: 1 :; 2 ,~
(9.14) ct - at t at t bt,
t t1 t2
(9.15) Ct - At t At ,
(9.1u) Ct - At1 t At2,-~3-
Starting from the simplifying assumption that bank transactions
do not require labor, the balance restrictíons on the activities of the
bank can be formulated:
í9.17) ct - ct - Ct f Ct ~ ut f ute
Further, we assume that
central "outside" bank)
t - 1,2,...
an "outside" agent (i.e. the government or a
imposes




x~.Ct ~ ut t ut, t- 1,2,...,
x2.cZt - ct ~ 0, t - 1,2,...,
concerning
where the given constants x~,x2 are positive and smaller than one.
Concerning the economic behavior of the bank, we assume a
competitive situation; i.e.: we assume that the only information con-
cerning the money-markets as a whole is constituted by the interest
rates. Of course, such an assumption makes sense for an economy with
two or more non-coóperative inside banks. However, if all banks in such
an economic system work under the same conditions it can be shown
(viz. Shubik) that the aggregate results can be found in model with only
one bank in the competitive setting as mentioned above. For such a bank,
the economic behavior, under given invariant external conditíons con-
stituted by interest factors a~ R~ Y? 1 and outstanding bankshares
u~,u2, is characterized by the single-period decision problem:
t
(9.20) `Y .- max a.C- -B.C - Y.c~~ t c~
over C-, C}, cx, c~ 0,
subject to:~ t
c-c - C } C- ~ u~tu2
x~,C- ~ u~tu2
.4
x2.c~ - c ~ 0 }
For u~tu2 ~ 0, the corresponding bank dividend-factor is defined by:
(9.21) . :- Y'~(u1}u2),
provided there is an optímal solution.
We observe that ( 9.20) is linear programming problem. Thus,
with the help of the corresponding dual problem, we can deduce the
following properties:
Proposition 9.22.: For x~, x2 ~ 0, x~, x2 ( 1, and a~ 1, problem (9.20)
possesses an optimal solution if and only if B,y ? 1.
Froposition 9.23.: Let a ~ 1, S~ 1, y ~ 1, and let x~, x2 be positive
and smaller than one. Further, let Y:- (y-x?)~(1-x2). Then:
(,1) In the case that S ~ a ~ a: action ~;~ } , Y (c,c ,C ,C-) is optimal
...ie
if and only if : c- 0, c- 0, C} - 0, C- - u~tu~.
(2) In the case that s~ a, Y~ s: action (c,c ,CT,C-) is optimal
if and only if : c- 0, c~~ - 0, -C} t C- - u~tu2, x2.C- - u~tu2.
ti ss tif
(3) In the case that Y ~ a, R~ Y: action (c,c ,C ,C-) is optimal
~ ~ ~~
if and only if : C} - 0, c-c t C- - u~tu2, x~.C- - u~tu2, x2.c - c.
...:e f
(4) In the case that s ~ a, Y- B: action (c,c ,C ,C-) is optimal
~~` t - 1 2 - 1 2 ~~~ if and only if : c-c -C tC - u fu , x~.C - u}u , x2.c - c.
(5) In the case that u~tu2 ~ 0: e-(a~x~) t(1-1~x~).min(a,s,Y).F'or this model we defiiie an invariant competitive equilibrium
as a combinatioii (p,q,á,é,á,s,y),
ie ' t d~ .~e
{(Zl,wi,'s1,u1,Sl,s 1,A l,A 1)}i-1e (xeveY~b~b ) ~ (C~~ ~C{~c-)~
with s1 t s2 ~ U and with u1 t u2 ~ 0, such that, simultaneously:
i i i i i ~~i }i i
(a) For each individual i, action (z ,w ,s ,u ,á ,á ,Á ,Á ) is
optimal for (9.5) with (p,q,d,e,a,S,Y) :- (p,q,á,ê,á,s,y) and
with (sl,ul,al~aeti'Ati~Á i) ,- (Si'ui'ái'a~ci'pti'~ i)
0 0 0 0 0 0
ie
(b) (z,v,y,b,b ) is optimal for (9.10) with
(P~qeY~sles2) :- (P~9~Yes1~s2).
(c) The dividend-factcr d satisfies: p.y t b t Y.b~ - d.(s1 t s2)
3: }
(d) (c,c ,C ,C-) is optimal for (9.20) with
1 2 1 2
(a~R~Y~u ~u ) .- (á~S~Y~u ~u ).
(e) The dividend-factor ê satisfies: á.C--s.C}-y.c"tc - é.(u1tu2).
(f) Total demand and total supply of "wheat" and "labor" are equal;
i.e. z1 t'z2 t xtY, w1 tw2-v.
(g) The total amound of fiat money hoard by the agents is equal to the
1 2
initial amount of fiat money; i.e. á t á t b t c- M. (Note M~ 0).
(h) Total demand and total supply of bank money are equal; i.e.
::1 ;:2 -:b 9e
ê t á t b - c .
(i) Total demand and total supply of saving deposits are equal;
i.e. A}1t A}2 - C}.
(j) Total demand and total supply of bank credits are equal; i.e.
Á 1 t Á 2- C-.
Using the properties of the underlying optimization problems,
,~
we shall construct numerical example of an I.C.E. where C~ 0 and where-46-
C- ~ 0. It will appear that, for such equilibrium, the constants in
individual's credit limits (viz. 9.2.) have to be chossen in a particular
manner which is related to the constants of the solvability and liquidity
restrictions of the bank (viz. 9.18. and 9.19.). Obvious, this implies
that an equilibrium exist, for particular values of the constants, only.
In the numerical example we take: n1 :- 0.9, x1 :- 0.5, x2 :- 0.5.
Further we assume n2 ~ n1, implying (by 9.8-(4) and by equilibrium
condition i) that an equilibrium with C} ~ 0 is possible, only if
~- 1~~r1; so S- 1.111. Moreover, the assumption s1 t s2 ~ 0, u1tu2~ 0
implies (viz. 9.8-(2) and (3)): d~ 1~~r1, ê~ 1~~r1; i.e. d~ 1.711,
ê~ 1.1]1. By virtue of 9.23-(5), the relations ê~ 1~n1, s- 1~nlimply:
~
a~ 1~n1, and next, by 9.8-(7): á1 t á 1 ~ 0.
Turning back to the max. problem of the bank, 9.23-(3) shows that C} ~ 0 is
possible, only if Y:- (y-x2)~(1-x2) ~ s.
With 0 ~ x2 ~ 1, this implies y~1, and next, by 9.8-(1):
~e ~e
d1 - 0, á2 - 0. Clearly, with á1 t á 1~ 0, the latter implies á 1~ 0
~~
and c~ 0, as well. From 9.23-(1), (2), (3), and from positivity of
C} ) ~ , c~~, we may conclude Y:- (y-x2)~(1-x2 - s.
Substituting x2 :- 0.5, s:- 1~0.9, we find Y- 1.056.
Now, by 9.6-(4), ( 5) and by 9.7-(4), ( 5), we can deduce that
ê- d and may be chosen in the interval [1.111, 1.11697].
We take d:~ 1.116, é:- 1.116. Then, with the help of 9.23-(5), á can
be determined as: á -1.114.
Summarizing, we have:
(9.24) Assumption:
n1 :- 0.9, ~1 ' ~2,
x1 .- 0.5,
t
x2 .- 0.5, C ~ o.
'.9.25) Results: á- 1.114, S- 1.111, y- 1.056, d- ê- 1.116,
á1 - 0, ê.2 - 0.- 47 -
In order to elaborate the productive activities of the firm
we specify the production by:
0.75 0.25
(y.26) Assumption: f(x,v) :- (0.5).x .v .
Labor supply is specified by:
(9.27) Assumption: w1 .- 1, w2 .- 1.
Clearly, in connection with 9.11, 9.7-(2) and with equilibrium
conàition f, the latter implies v- 2. From (5.7) we have:
p.z -(0,75~0.25).q.v, p."y -(á~o.25).q.v, and hence, by equilibrium
condition f, p.(z1t'z2) -(2.92).q. Since, á1 - 0, á2 - 0, y.8-(9) shows:
1 2 ~ 1 ~2
p.(z tz )- y.(á -á ), and therefore: (with y- 1.056):
:r 1 ~:2
á t á -(2.765).q. Further, by y.12-(4) and by ê~ y, we find b- 0,
b" - 0; implying (viz. equilibrium condition g and li): c- M,
,~
c~~ - á~~1 } á~~2, s.nd next: q- c ~(2.765). Specifying the amount of fiat
money by:
(9.28) Assumption: M :- 100,
we arrive at the following results (viz. 9.23-(4)); c- 700, c~~ - 200,
q- 72.30. Now, with the help of (5.7), all quantities concerning the
firm can be determined. Summarizing:
A~
(9.29) Results: v- 2, b - 0, b- 0, c- 700, c" - 200
q- 72.30, p- 1.70, x- 255, y - 378,
p.x - 433.20, p.y - 644.00, s1 f s2 - 577.60.
Turning our attention to the saving and credit contracts of the
bank, we see (by á~ 1~n1, 9.8-(5)) that A-1 - 0, and next (viz. equilibrium- 48 -
condition j) À~- C. By virtue of 9.23, this implies:
~
Á-2 ~ c - c- 100. So, it appears that the constants ~1,~2 in individuals
credit restriction (9.2) have to be large enough. Specifying:
(9.30) Assumption: ~1 :- 0.4, 0 ~~2 ~( á-1), n2 ~ 1~á - 0.897.
We shall construct an equilibrium by choosing s2 - 0, u2 - 0, or choosing
~- 0, or by choosing n2 - 0.897. Then, by virtue of 9.8-(6), we may
2
specify Á2 - 253.33, and consequently: C- - 252.33.
Then, by 9.23-(4), one will find: C} - 26.7, u1 t u2 - 126.66.
t2
Since A - 0(implied by s ~ 1~n2), equilibrium condition i, implies:
~} - 26.7. We observe that share holding by individual 2 is possible.
For instance, putting fi2 :- 0.897 we have n2.d - 1.001 ~ 1 which is
compatible with condition 9.8-(2) and condition 9.8-(3).
~~nyway, specifying:
(9.31) Assumption: u2 .- 0, s2 .- 0.
the conditions 9.8-(7), (8), (9) (with s~ - 0) imply: z1 - 95, z2 - 26.
(9.32) Results: At1 - 26.7, À 1- 0, A}2 - 0, À2- 253.33,
s1 - 577.60, u1 - 126.66,
C} - 26.7, C- - 252.33,
"z1 - 95, "z2 - 26.References
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